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Abstract: 
Claims that decentralization could improve government accountability and 
responsiveness led to its adoption as a policy objective across the globe. But recent 
empirical work finds little evidence of ‘tier effects’ in practice; instead, significant 
variation exists even between most-similar bodies. Recognizing the value of FOI in 
facilitating large-scale data collection, and that the UK’s institutional diversity offers an 
important source of between- and within-tier variation, I compile a large new dataset by 
emailing two separate FOI requests to 812 UK public bodies with an executive function. 
Identifying significant variation in timeliness and quality between UK territories, I argue 
that differing foundational motives can help explain patterns of responsiveness between 
institutions established by transparency-facing reforms and those designed to resolve 
conflict. A lack of evidence that by lower-tier governments are generally more responsive 
reaffirms the recent challenges to the more fundamental claims about decentralization 
that informed academic debate and real-world practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the closing decades of the last century, countries across the globe adopted 
decentralization reforms in response to bottom-up demands for greater autonomy and 
self-government and top-down pressures by international organizations such as USAID 
and the World Bank (Hindriks & Lockwood 2009). In part, this advocacy was influenced 
by longstanding theoretical expectations of ‘first generation’ fiscal federalism theory 
(Qian & Weingast 1997) that expected decentralization and transparency to trigger 
efficiency gains from increased accountability and proximity that could reconnect citizens 
with their governments (for example, World Bank 1999, DFID 2002).  
More recent research has, however, severely tested the unidirectional and 
optimistic claims previously ascribed to decentralization. Positivist in orientation and 
rooted in a political economy framework (Wibbels 2006), ‘second generation’ theories 
assert that prior contributions overlooked agency problems within government 
(Moorkherjee 2015), incorrectly assumed that politicians and bureaucrats’ incentives 
align with citizen preferences (Prud’homme 1995), and misunderstood the complex 
intertwining of functions across tiers of government (Wibbels 2006). Above all, this 
research has been cognizant that outcomes under decentralization are intrinsically linked 
to the cultures and organizational heterogeneities that underpin institutions and shape the 
behavior of political actors (Rodden & Wibbels 2002). But the field continues to struggle 
with institutional endogeneity: we cannot ascribe causal claims to institutions if those 
institutions are themselves responses to the underlying social, cultural or demographic 
characteristics of the societies in which they are embedded (Rodden 2006). 
Global decentralization reforms have paralleled an even more expansive 
worldwide proliferation of Freedom of Information laws, a key means of promoting 
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transparency (Worthy 2013) that had been taken up in 117 countries by 2017 
(freedominfo.org). Indeed, FOI reforms share with decentralization their adoption as a 
tool to advance transparency, openness and citizen access in OECD and developing 
countries alike. But while this expansion has been the focus of many country-specific and 
cross-case studies, FOI has only slowly been recognized as a potentially powerful tool in 
empirical research (Savage & Hyde 2014), and tests of public bodies’ responsiveness to 
FOI requests remain comparatively rare.  
Addressing the challenge posed by endogeneity and context-specificity in the 
field, I argue that two features of the UK case are of particular value to a research question 
that tests the theorized correlates of government responsiveness. First, the UK is a venue 
for comprehensive FOI legislation covering a sufficiently large number of organizations 
at all tiers to facilitate data collection and statistical analysis. Second, these organizations 
are extremely diverse, comprising traditionally-secretive bodies that long predate 
modern-era interests in transparency, hundreds of local governments that have been 
subject to openness requirements for several decades, and newly-created intermediate-
tier bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland that diverge significantly in their 
foundational motivations.  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. After first specifying the ‘tier 
effects’ that traditionally expected lower tier bodies to be more responsive and the ‘second 
generation’ challenges to this supposition, I investigate three sources of context-specific 
variation that would cross-cut any such effects; namely organizational-level 
heterogeneity; administrative capacity constraints; and institutions’ foundational motives 
that should incline certain public bodies towards – or away from – greater openness. I 
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then specify the usefulness of the UK case in testing of the role of institutional culture in 
outcomes. Third, I identify the methodology and data used to operationalize three 
hypotheses as part of a large-N research design. I then email two FOI requests to the 
complete universe of 812 UK public bodies with an executive function at either the 
central-, devolved- or local- level to construct a large new dataset, codifying responses to 
these two requests to create two objective measures of responsiveness. Fifth, I analyze 
these measures of timeliness and quality against a number of potential correlates for the 
universe of UK public bodies. I conclude by discussing the generalizability of these 
findings for broader academic understanding of the effects of decentralization and 
transparency reforms such as FOI on government responsiveness. 
 
2. THEORIES AND CHALLENGES IN EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIVENESS 
2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE CHALLENGE TO DECENTRALIZATION THEORY FROM 
ORGANIZATIONAL HETEROGENEITY 
 
Decentralization – the transfer of central government powers and functions to authorities 
at regional and local levels – has transformed the constitutions of growing numbers of 
countries over the past several decades. By the early 1990s, and influenced by early fiscal 
federalism theory, advocacy by donor governments and international organizations 
helped foster a broad consensus that decentralization was a positive force for more 
satisfied consumer-voters, better democracy and freer markets (Beramendi 2007, see for 
example World Bank 1999, DFID 2002). 
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A central tenet of this consensus was the expectation that decentralization might improve 
the accountability of government to citizens, what Faguet terms “the most important 
theoretical argument concerning decentralization [and] central to the motivations of real 
world reformers” (2014: 2). Although its definition is contested in the literature (Hindriks 
& Lockwood 2005), accountability at a basic level should involve an obligation on a 
public official or public body to explain and justify their conduct (Bovens 2007). But in 
contrast with definitional complexity, the theoretical ‘promise’ of decentralized decision-
making is simple: it shortens the accountability chain from decision-maker to citizen, 
allowing greater expression for local needs and more opportunities to hold decision-
makers to account (Lieberman 2018).  
These theoretical gains from a shorter chain of accountability require a preference 
revelation or linking mechanism between citizens and the decision-making process. In 
traditional fiscal federalism theory, this mechanism is downward accountability derived 
from democratic elections, lobbying, or by “voting with your feet” by moving to other 
jurisdictions (Rodden 2011), all of which assume knowledge and meaningful local 
participation. Hence the importance of access to information and openness as a necessary 
first condition for preference revelation and accountability (Dethier 2002, Albalate 2013). 
As Azfar et al. argue, “[u]nless the public knows what goods and services are provided 
by the government, how well they are provided, who the beneficiaries are, and how much 
they cost, it cannot demand effective government” (1999: 12). 
Responsiveness is also a broad concept with many possible measures, frequently 
(but not exclusively) referring to the welfare economics premise that decentralization 
should be associated with more informed and responsive local governments because of 
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an improved fit between public goods provision and local preferences or needs (see for 
example Besley & Burgess 2002, Faguet 2004). Government replies to Freedom of 
Information Act requests are a different measure of responsiveness from allocative 
efficiency considerations such as these. But far from being a trivial curiosity, FOI laws 
have become one of the most important ways of promoting transparency worldwide 
(Worthy 2013). Their rapid international expansion also allows researchers to test 
government responsiveness not only across countries but between the tiers of government 
using objective metrics. FOI, therefore, is an important means to illuminate one aspect of 
a concept that is frequently challenging in empirical research. 
The FOI field is far smaller than that of the enormous research literature 
surrounding decentralization and fiscal federalism. But while the two fields rarely 
intersect directly, a limited number of contributions from the transparency literature 
mirror ‘first generation’ decentralization theory in suggesting that local governments 
might be relatively more open than central governments. For example, in the United 
States, Peters & Pierre (1998) argue that higher levels of citizen trust confer a greater 
degree of legitimacy on state and local governments, giving them greater governing 
latitude than their federal counterpart. And in considering the relatively recent passage of 
FOI laws in the UK, Worthy (2013) argues that “local government was already, in relative 
terms, more open” than the center, largely because local governments had been subject to 
public access legislation such as open meeting requirements for far longer.1  
                                                          
1 The Local Government Acts of 1972 and 1985 introduced similar requirements to US ‘open 
meeting’ legislation that obliged councils to allow public access to meetings and documents, and 
national legislation not specific to local government such as data protection and audit regulations 
also provide access to particular personal records or accounts (Worthy 2013). 
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But over the past two decades, this normative presumption that decentralization 
should improve responsiveness has been fatally undermined by two parallel 
developments in the field. Not only has empirical testing found little support for earlier 
universal notions (for example, Triesman 2000, Rodden 2006), but theoretical approaches 
to investigating outcomes under decentralization have been recast: the previous 
benevolent assumptions of welfare economics have since been supplanted by political 
economy applications that focus instead on agency problems in government (Wibbels 
2006, Moorkherjee 2015).  
For the purposes of explaining government responsiveness, the repeated finding 
that voters are ill-informed about public goods provision by different tiers of government 
(Wibbels 2006) is a particular challenge to decentralization theory, because it suggests 
that the traditional focus on downward accountability mechanisms between local officials 
and their voters are likely to be misplaced. In successive country cases, local elections 
have been found to be weak mechanisms for preference revelation and for voters to hold 
local politicians to account. They are associated with far lower levels of participation and 
often reflect the electorate’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the political environment 
at the central level rather than issues specific to local races (Heath et al. 1999); in other 
words, they are second–order elections (see Marien, Dassonneville & Hooghe 2015).  
In sum, the primary verdict of second generation contributions is that “when it 
comes to the political and economic consequences of federalism [and decentralization], 
the devil is in the details” (Beramendi 2007: 759-760). But while this awareness has 
necessitated a far more incremental rate of progress that is alert to case-specific 
institutional configurations, the field has been eager to exploit new methodologies to shed 
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light on persistent empirical questions. That context specificity matters should not be an 
impediment to better understanding the institutional correlates of government 
responsiveness.  
Indeed, as in other fields in the broader discipline (e.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 
2017), the FOI literature has made strides in understanding these correlates of 
responsiveness through repeated evidence of significant individual-level heterogeneity 
that yields dissimilar outcomes even among most-similar organizations. Not only 
organizations’ political or bureaucratic leadership but the individual officers tasked with 
responding to FOI requests may differ in their personal partisanship and cognitive biases 
(such as being pro- or anti-transparency), and records officers may vary in their ability 
and experience with FOI laws. As Piotrowski (2011) argues: 
“Administrative culture of an organization is very much driven by personalities… 
The personalities of the individuals in leadership positions, and those of front line 
administrators… definitely affect the level of transparency in a town. A spirit of 
openness established by leadership and embraced by administrators, influences 
access to government” (2011: 26) 
 
In this regard, a number of contributions in the FOI literature have detected 
organizational-level heterogeneity that may influence the responsiveness of records 
professionals, including administrative culture, the ‘gadfly factor’, local media activism, 
organizational resources and political competition (Piotrowski 2011), differences 
between political and back-office facing departments (Welch 2012) and even an officer’s 
personal feelings towards the requester and the likely reactions of their colleagues 
(Kimball 2012). In the UK, Worthy (2013) finds that central government FOI 
responsiveness was “uneven”, with “different departments transparent to different 
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degrees” (Worthy 2010: 548), and that such patterns were dependent “on internal cultures 
and leadership... [which is] crucial to FOI at all levels” (Worthy 2013: 400, 409).  
Such organizational-level heterogeneity implies that a large amount of variation 
must be expected in understanding institutional responsiveness that cross cuts tier. But 
there is scope in the burgeoning literature for further investigation of responsiveness 
across a large number of bodies using objective metrics codified remotely. 
A first hypothesis can therefore be drawn from the perspectives developed in this 
section as follows. Despite theoretical expectations from early theory that lower tiers of 
government might be associated with greater responsiveness, any differences between the 
tiers are likely to be overwhelmed by heterogeneity that will yield significantly different 
outcomes even between otherwise highly-similar organizations:  
H1: Organizational-level heterogeneity overwhelms ‘tier effects’ that might 
otherwise expect differentiated responsiveness between central- and local-
tier bodies 
 
2.2 THE CHALLENGE OF CAPACITY 
Quite apart from electoral accountability mechanisms and officer-level variation in 
proclivities towards openness, decentralization and information access laws create new 
challenges for public organizations that may have starkly unequal capacities to discharge 
their responsibilities (Terman & Feiock 2014). Capacity constraints have been 
particularly prominent since the 2007-08 financial crisis and subsequent public spending 
constraints in many OECD countries, and such pressures have been particularly acute at 
the lower tier where governments often do not have legal authority to run large budget 
deficits. If officials do not have the policy expertise, staffing and/or fiscal resources to 
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discharge their responsibilities (Howlett 2009, Terman & Feiock 2014), lower-tier 
governments may simply lack the capacity to put into effect the greater responsiveness 
expected of them in theory.  
Given the claim in contemporary FOI theory (in the UK literature) that local 
government should be more responsive, it is essential to test such expectations. But in 
contrast to the large decentralization literature, there is surprisingly little research that 
considers how local capacity constraints can influence government responsiveness (or 
even outcomes in general) (Terman & Feiock 2014). Using evidence from FOI responses 
to fill this gap in understanding capacity constraints I test a second hypothesis, namely: 
H2: Governments subject to greater capacity challenges will be less 
responsive to FOI requests  
 
2.3 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE IN OPENNESS 
A third cross-cutting factor to the ‘tier effect’ assumptions of decentralization theory also 
concerns organizational culture; namely the premise that institutions more inclined 
towards openness might be more amenable to the demands of FOI. As outlined in this 
section, previous research demonstrates the importance of factors such as administrative 
culture, local advocacy and leadership to institutional openness. But a narrow focus on 
heterogeneity between local political leaderships and FOI officers – or on differentiated 
transparency norms between local and central governments – neglects the global 
expansion in the regional tier (Hooghe, Marks & Schakel 2010) that has paralleled the 
growth of FOI legislation itself. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that political 
institutions newly-created in the modern government era might be more receptive to 
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openness demands – and more capable of entrenching transparency into their institutional 
norms – than bodies with long histories of operating in closed systems. 
Not all newly-created intermediate-tier bodies are however created with similar 
foundational inclinations. In large parts of the world, federalism and decentralization have 
been adopted as tools in conflict resolution, as in Iraq, Nigeria and Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
Recasting violence into more peaceful forms of interaction requires complex institutional 
architectures – such as minority groups’ inclusion in powersharing mechanisms like 
consociationalism (Keil 2012, Wallensteen 2015) – and these conflict-resolution 
imperatives may act contrary to the transparency and responsiveness objectives that have 
inspired decentralization reforms elsewhere. As The Economist argued in November 
2013: 
Peace often fails to bring the prosperity that might give it lasting value to all sides. 
Powersharing creates weak governments; nobody trusts anyone else enough to 
grant them real power… Lacking genuine political competition, with no 
possibility of decisive electoral victories, public administration in newly pacified 
nations is often a mess. (The Economist, 9th November 2013) 
 Drawing from conceptions of diverging institutional foundations, a third 
hypothesis anticipates that the foundational imperatives of public bodies will influence 
their subsequent responsiveness: 
H3: Institutions inclined towards openness and transparency will be more 
responsive to FOI requests than institutions designed to resolve conflict  
Interactions between these hypotheses suggest that ‘tier effect’ expectations of 
greater responsiveness under decentralization are likely to be insufficient at best.  
 
3. TESTING RESPONSIVENESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
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In investigating how the cross-cutting factors outlined above might offer a more durable 
explanation than tier effects in understanding the responsiveness of central, devolved and 
local governments to FOI requests, two features of the UK case are of particular value to 
the research design. First, it is a venue for comprehensive FOI legislation covering a 
sufficiently large number of organizations at all tiers to facilitate data collection and 
statistical analysis. And second, significant differentiation in the foundational motivations 
of the regional-tier institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland offers an ideal 
test to investigate whether institutions inclined towards openness might be more 
responsive than consociational institutions designed to resolve conflict. 
 
3.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL HETEROGENEITY - UK 
In contrast to perspectives that local elections offer voters a preference revelation or 
electoral control mechanism, UK local elections have long been argued to be second-
order contests (Heath et al. 1999). They are subject to considerably lower turnouts than 
first-order general elections and “local government election results are a largely 
accidental by-product of central government’s popularity at local election time” (Miller 
1988: 2).  
Moreover, the UK public sector provides an extremely diverse set of 
organizational models from which to test differences between public bodies at the same 
tier. Along with New Zealand, Britain’s Next Steps initiative most fully epitomized the 
New Public Management restructurings undertaken in many OECD countries in the 
1980s and 1990s (Schick 2002), becoming the principal organizational type for UK 
central government service delivery (James et al. 2011), with approximately 80% of civil 
servants relocated from ministerial departments (Wettenhall 2005: 616). Principal-agent 
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considerations that inform the political economy orientation shared by much of the recent 
decentralization literature are therefore explicit in the organizational specification of 
many UK public bodies. 
 
3.2 THE CHALLENGE OF CAPACITY - UK 
‘Capacity’ is a term with a very broad reach and a number of possible proxy measures, 
none of which are fully satisfactory on their own. Unfortunately, data is not generally 
comparable across the vastly different bodies in the sample (compare for example the £4 
million annual budget of West Somerset District Council – the smallest in England – with 
the £173 billion spent by the UK Department for Work and Pensions). To consider 
capacity challenges I therefore limit the investigation to local government bodies, a 
suitable sample for two reasons. Not only do they represent the largest single subset of 
relatively-comparable organizations in the data (N=433), but local government is the 
destination at least 70-80% of all FOI requests in the UK, a proportion which is growing 
(Worthy & Hazell 2017).  
Paradoxically, existing contributions argue that “local authorities have managed 
this disproportionately large volume more efficiently than central government” (Worthy 
et al. 2017: 490). But this rapid increase in FOI requests coincided with a long squeeze 
on public finances that has restricted local authority budgets since 2010, a policy which 
offers one potential source of variation for considering capacity. Because local 
government funding is a devolved government responsibility in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, changes to local government resource budgets have varied significantly 
across the UK. The UK coalition government’s decision in 2010 to undertake deep cuts 
to English local government resource budgets was not matched elsewhere: English 
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councils spent 22% less in real terms in 2015-16 than they did in 2009-10 (Amin-Smith 
et al. 2016), compared with reductions of 15% in Scotland and 11.5% in Wales (Financial 
Times, 19 July 2015). Having faced more substantial cuts, English councils’ 
responsiveness to FOI requests might be relatively more affected than counterparts in 
Scotland and Wales. 
However, resource cuts are a blunt measure of capacity because other social, 
cultural or political factors may also influence outcomes across the four territories of the 
UK. A more granular approach therefore draws on local government budget data collected 
by the UK Department for Communities and Local Government. Since this data is not 
directly comparable across the four UK territories, these additional variables represent 
proxies for two possible capacity measures for the 353 councils in England: the local 
council’s total budget for central services (‘back-office’ functions) in 2014-15; and the 
percentage change in this budget over the austerity period between 2010-11 and 2014-15. 
If resources are a factor in the overall level of organizational transparency (Piotrowski 
2011), responsiveness should increase with staff and budget size. Because this data is an 
imperfect and incomplete measure, additional variables that might influence government 
responsiveness can also be included, such as socio-economic data collated at the local 
government level, and local council political composition data. 
 
3.3 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE IN OPENNESS - UK 
A key advantage in investigating the relationship between institutional foundations and 
responsiveness is the UK’s diversity in the longevity and underpinning norms of its 
governmental institutions. As one of the oldest consolidated democratic nation-states, the 
 How Institutional Culture Trumps Tier Effects 
 
15 
British central government’s working norms long predate modern-era interests in 
transparency and open government. This historical backdrop has informed the prevailing 
understanding that central government should be less open than local government because 
executive dominance and political traditions entrenched secrecy as a “historical, cultural 
and institutional phenomenon” over many centuries (Worthy 2017: 17).2 But in “the most 
radical constitutional change [the UK] has seen since the Great Reform Act of 1832” 
(Bogdanor 2001: 1), devolution recast the UK’s state machinery by creating three new 
intermediate-tier institutions with significant ‘self-rule’ autonomy, underpinned 
(unusually for a decentralizing state) by entirely divergent foundational imperatives. 
Devolution to Scotland and Wales formed part of a broad constitutional reform 
agenda during the first Blair Government, including FOI legislation, the Human Rights 
Act and (later) the replacement of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords with a 
Supreme Court. Labelled “New Politics” by contemporary commentators (e.g. Cairney 
2012, Mitchell 2000, Osmond 1998), the potential for more transparent and responsive 
government was one of the key justifications for the establishment of the Scottish 
Parliament and National Assembly for Wales (e.g. Michael 1999).3 Ambitions for 
transparency and responsiveness in the new institutions were particularly embedded in 
Scotland; indeed, ‘access and participation’ became one of the four key principles adopted 
by the consultative group tasked with drafting the detailed proposals on how Scotland’s 
devolved institutions should operate (Consultative Steering Group 1999) 
                                                          
2 Indeed, the FOI Acts only closely succeeded the Official Secrets Act 1989, a law that further 
entrenched secrecy norms (Worthy 2017). 
3 In a keynote lecture during his short tenure as the National Assembly for Wales’ inaugural First 
Secretary, Alun Michael argued that integral to the ‘New Politics’ was that “The government of 
Wales is no longer carried out behind closed doors, but out in the open. And that can only be a 
good thing for democracy and for the quality of our decision making” (1999: 7). 
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In contrast, three factors underpinned the establishment of Northern Ireland’s 
devolved institutions:  
1. Conflict resolution through mandatory powersharing - the 1998 Belfast 
Agreement that re-established devolved government attempted to stem chronic 
political violence by addressing not only constitutional and security matters but 
also human rights and social and economic inclusion (Wilford et al. 2003), 
creating an architecture in which conflict resolution through political 
accommodation was the primary imperative (Carmichael 1999).4  
2. Political paralysis – linkages between elections and government formation are 
obscured in Northern Ireland politics because the main British parties do not 
generally compete in Northern Ireland elections. As a result, local politicians 
were offered “all the advantages of political activity with none of the 
disadvantages of responsibility” (Prior 1982, cited in Bogdanor 2001: 99). 
3. A direct lineage from the previous Stormont Government and the post-1972 
Direct Rule machinery – indeed, the post-1972 Northern Ireland Office (NIO) 
was the “lineal descendant of the old Stormont Cabinet Office” (Bell 1987: 212). 
Northern Ireland’s civil servants working for the NIO “found it difficult to adjust 
to the accountability demands placed on them by the return of devolved 
government in December 1999” (Knox 2009: 436). 5 
                                                          
4 NI’s devolved institutions may have “institutionalised sectarianism and sectarian division” 
(Wilson & Wilford 2003 in McLaughlin 2005: 115) and worsened public administration with “less 
cohesive government” and decisions “made on a lowest common denominator basis” (Birrell 
2009: 245). 
5 Northern Ireland has also not amended the Westminster-passed FOI Act despite holding 
legislative competence. As Wilford & Wilson (2001) argue, “So far the Assembly has followed 
Westminster in its freedom-of-information regime, not yet exploring as in Scotland a more liberal 
variant. A combination of the parochialism of some members and the lack of habituation of the 
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A fourth factor, sectarian partisan competition and historic discrimination by some 
councils in employment and housing, is also key to understanding Northern Ireland local 
government. Northern Ireland’s local authorities emerged from an era in which council 
chambers were described as a “bearpit of sectarianism” (Knox 1998: 1) and where 
“religious discrimination by some local authorities in employment and housing [became] 
a motivating factor behind the civil rights protests in 1968 and subsequent outbreak of 
disturbance” (Knox 1998: 3).  
While such disturbances are less apparent since the 1998 Belfast Agreement, 
these divergent institutional underpinnings provide a theoretical basis for anticipating that 
Northern Ireland’s local governments might be less responsive than councils in England, 
Scotland and Wales, and that Northern Ireland’s devolved-tier bodies would also be 
associated with poorer responsiveness than their counterparts in Scotland and Wales.  
In short, the tiers and institutions of UK government provide opportunities to test 
not only the traditional arguments that decentralization could improve responsiveness, 
but within-tier diversity also provides a means to consider the alternative correlates of 
responsiveness that might embed openness within an institution. 
 
4. MEASURING RESPONSIVENESS THROUGH FOI REQUESTS 
The global Freedom of Information expansion has spawned a number of country-specific 
and comparative studies that assess its impact in a number of different settings (Hazell & 
Worthy 2010). However, FOI legislation has been far less-frequently employed as a 
                                                          
Northern Ireland civil service to close democratic scrutiny has led to tensions over access to 
information held by the executive” (2001: 4). 
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methodology in experimental research, although this is beginning to change (e.g. Lewis 
& Wood 2012, Ross & Whittaker 2009, Cherry & McMenemy 2013, Michener & 
Rodriguez 2015, Worthy et al. 2017). 
In contrast to other potential and existing measures, there are a number of 
advantages of using emailed FOI requests to obtain an objective, comparative metric of 
government responsiveness. First, the technique relies on a universal requirement that 
public bodies must respond to or refuse the request within a statutory period (20-working 
days in the UK). Second, because FOI responses generated remotely to identically-
worded emails can be codified into objective metrics, the data is less likely to capture 
respondents’ impressions that may bias traditional governance indictors (Rodríguez-Pose 
& Di Cataldo 2014) by creating ‘echo chambers’ in which experts use unrelated general 
measures of country performance such as GDP per capita to assess transparency (Bauhr 
et al. 2017: 28). And third, government bodies at all tiers investigated here have equal 
access to email as a universal means of communication. 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (applying to England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland) and the Freedom of Information Act (Scotland) 2002 came into force on 1 
January 2005. These acts have extensive coverage of at least 100,000 bodies (Birkinshaw 
2010), established a general right of access to information held by public bodies, and 
imposed a duty upon public bodies to disclose information held by them on receipt of a 
request for information. The legislation also established Information Commissioners to 
act as enforcers and champions of the legislation. These commissioners are publicly 
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appointed6 and are independent from government in disseminating information to the 
public, in issuing guidance to public bodies on their legal obligations, and in their 
enforcement function where bodies are adjudicated to be in breach of the Acts. Because 
compliance requirements do not vary between the types of public bodies covered by the 
Acts, FOI regulations on their own should not affect the opportunities for certain bodies 
to shirk in complying with disclosure requirements.7 
 
4.1 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To operationalize the test of responsiveness to FOI requests, a complete list of email 
addresses for the universe of public bodies subject to FOI laws was assembled from 
official registers and the annual reference guides in the devolved countries: the Scottish 
Political Guide, The Wales Yearbook and the Northern Ireland Yearbook. 
Organizations were emailed FOI requests if they were considered to have an 
executive function at any level of government. Selecting the universe of public bodies 
intended to avoid sample biases and to generate sufficient responses: despite the legal 
obligation to respond, previous work has reported a low response rate (e.g. Michener & 
Rodriguez 2015). Along with UK ministerial departments, the devolved governments and 
local councils, Non-Departmental Public Bodies at both the UK-level (such as the Homes 
                                                          
6 The UK Information Commissioner is appointed on the nomination of the UK Government 
subject to a pre-appointment hearing of the relevant parliamentary select committee. The Scottish 
Information Commissioner is appointed on the nomination of the Scottish Parliament. 
7 In common with other FOI legislation, there are a number of exemptions for disclosing certain 
information, such as the absolute exemptions covering information received from security bodies, 
court records, and communications with senior members of the Royal Family. (Information 
Commissioner’s Office: When can we refuse a request for information? Accessed 18 November 
2017 at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/refusing-a-request/) 
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and Communities Agency) and devolved-level (such as the Wales Audit Office) were 
included. Advisory and Tribunal Non-Departmental Public Bodies which sit infrequently 
and/or have a shoestring staff were excluded, as were town-, community- or parish- 
councils, universities, schools, police forces and fire authorities. Although public sector 
National Health Service (NHS) bodies in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were 
included, NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups in England (which had been recently 
established at the time of the trial) were excluded. Table 1 details the final set of 197 
central government bodies and 181 devolved government bodies. 
Table 1: Central and Devolved Public Bodies Receiving Two FOI requests 
Type of Agency UK Scotland Wales 
Northern 
Ireland 
Ministerial Department or Devolved Government 22 1 1 12† 
Executive Agency 39 8 0 0 
Non-Departmental Public Body 114 34 17 47 
Non-Ministerial Department 22 5 0 0 
Commissioner 0 6 4 1 
National Health Service body 0 23 10 12 
Total 197 77 32 72 
† Unlike Scotland or Wales, each ministerial department is established as separate corporate entity  
 
Table 2 details the 433 local councils that received two requests. A series of local 
government reorganizations effective 1974, 1986, 1995-1998 and 2009 replaced a 
uniform two-tier system across England, Scotland and Wales with a complicated hybrid. 
Although Scottish and Welsh reforms were straightforward, replacing the previous two-
tier system with 32 and 22 single-tier councils, the English system accommodates both 
continuity two-tier areas and single-tier authorities combining previously-separate county 
and borough functions. 
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Table 2: Local Authorities Receiving Two FOI requests, by Type 
Local Authority Type Number of Councils 
England  
Single-tier areas  
London Borough 32 
City of London Corporation 1 
Metropolitan Borough Council 36 
Unitary Authority 56 
Total Single Tier Authorities 125 
  
Two-tier areas  
Non-Metropolitan County Council (Upper tier)  27 
District or Borough Council (Lower tier) 201 
Total Two-Tier Authorities 228 
  
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland  
Unitary Authority (Scotland) 32 
Unitary Authority (Wales) 22 
District Council (Northern Ireland) 26 † 
Total Single Tier outside England 80 
† Since 1 April 2015, 11 single-tier districts 
The final wording of each email was identical for all organizations and is 
reproduced in Figure 1.8 The requests were drafted to be reasonable but sufficiently 
challenging, and needed to be equally relevant across a wide range of organizations with 
different functions and responsibilities. The questions illuminated two key features of an 
organization’s bureaucratic capacity and quality, namely asset management and 
procurement. The ability of an organization to keep track of its assets is fundamental to 
its governance; the first email therefore asked for detailed information on the number of 
laptops that had been issued to staff. The second email asked for information about single-
                                                          
8 A discussion on the research ethics of FOI is contained in the Appendix note A1 
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bidder contracting, a “red-flag” indicator of corruption (Fazekas et al. 2016: 369, also 
Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). This request asked organizations to state how many contracts had 
been put out for tender and how many were awarded after a process in which only one 
contractor submitted a bid. To test data retention quality, both emails asked for the most 
recent year available at the time of the trial (2013) and for older data (2010). 
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Figure 1: Sample Emails 
 
Trial 1: 
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act I would like to request the following information 
about the distribution of laptops to staff:  
 
Could you please provide me with the total number of laptops owned by your 
organisation that were registered to and/or in the possession of staff members (whether 
directly employed by your organisation or otherwise) on the following two dates: 
 
a) 1 May 2010 (or nearest available date – please specify), and  
 
b) 1 May 2013 (or nearest available date – please specify). 
 
I would prefer to receive this information electronically as a reply to this email. 
 
 
Trial 2: 
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act I would like to request the following information 
about the issuance of contracts:  
 
1. Could you please provide me with the total number of contracts put out for tender by 
your organisation during the following two periods:  
 
a) January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010 (or the nearest available 12-month period – 
please specify), and 
 
b) January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013 (or the nearest available 12-month period – 
please specify) 
 
2. For each of these two periods, please state how many of these contracts were awarded 
after a tendering process in which only one contractor submitted a bid. 
 
I would prefer to receive this information electronically as a reply to this email. 
 
 
In anticipation of receiving large volumes of data, two Gmail accounts were set 
up under my own name to receive responses from the requested organizations. The 
wording of each email was tested using a small trial sample including universities, fire 
authorities and police forces that were not on the list of recipients. The first email (asset 
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management) was sent to 849 public bodies between 28 February 2014 and 7 March 2014.  
Due to the UK Government’s abolition of regional probation trusts on 31 March 2014 
(between the two waves), 812 bodies received the second FOI between 19 August 2014 
and 8 October 2014. The subject of both emails was clearly stated as “Freedom of 
Information Request”. From responses to these requests, I created two large cross-
sectional datasets from observations of public bodies’ responsiveness at approximately 
the same point of time (or where any incidental differences in time would be ignored). 
Combining these two datasets into one – by coding organizations’ responses using 
standardized metrics – permitted the investigation of any variation between the two trials 
and the creation of composite measures for the two trials together. 
 
4.2 CODING PROCEDURE 
After emailing the FOI request to each public body, I logged the timing and content of 
each response and replied to any requests for clarification. Although coding responses to 
FOI requests can pose challenges to researchers, the requests deliberately asked for 
numerical data (such as the number of single-bidder contracts) that would be suitable for 
coding. I logged the timing and content of each reply, including the date on which the 
organization acknowledged and replied to the request, whether they provided precise or 
approximated information, and whether the information related to the specific dates or 
time period requested. I also recorded any additional relevant qualitative information 
provided by the responder. There is no legal requirement for respondents to acknowledge 
receipt of FOI requests; however, 641 out of 849 public bodies (76%) acknowledged the 
first email and 627 of 811 (77%) the second. I sent each email to the organization’s named 
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point of first customer contact, for example, reception@ceredigion.gov.uk. Where no first 
contact address was listed, or if emails were returned to sender, I redirected requests to 
the organization’s FOI team, for example freedomofinformation@darlington.gov.uk.  
There was significant variation in the administration of requests between 
organizations. Several wrote back to an incorrect email address. One English district 
council attached unrelated taxi invoices to its acknowledgement. Others used two separate 
replies but gave different answers to the same question in each response.9 Despite 
evidence from Scotland that councils rarely keep cost records (Cherry & McMenemy 
2013) excessive cost was the most common exemption claimed for refusal. Organizations 
frequently self-reported an incorrect 20-working day deadline by which they would 
respond, or gave an incorrect date on which they had received the email.  
 
4.3 RESPONSE VARIABLES 
Two variables of interest were constructed from the database to measure the timeliness 
and overall response quality. 
Timeliness: The first measure, a binary variable, assesses the timeliness of an 
organization’s two responses based on the number of days taken to respond. I score the 
organization one if both responses were received within 20-working days and zero 
otherwise. 
Quality: The second score gauges the quality of the two responses. For the first email, I 
assign a score of one (and zero otherwise) for each of the following: the date the data 
                                                          
9 Unless an organization’s second reply indicated that additional material was supplementary or 
correcting an earlier response, only the first response was coded. 
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refer to was exactly correct for 2010; the date the data refer to was exactly correct for 
2013; the number of laptops had been exactly stated for 2010; and the number of laptops 
had been exactly stated for 2013. Organizations that did not provide a response, or where 
a response was received late, scored zero. An answer providing the correct date and the 
exact number of laptops for both years and within the statutory deadline receives a 
maximum score of four. I then standardize this measure to range from zero to one.  
For the second email, I assign a score of one (and zero otherwise) for each of the 
following: the total number of contracts was specified for 2010; the total number of 
contracts was specified for 2013; the total number of single-bidder contracts was specified 
for 2010; the total number of single-bidder contracts was specified for 2013; the 2010 
information related to the 12-month date range which had been requested; and the 2013 
information related to the 12-month date range which had been requested. Thus the 
maximum possible score is six, and again, this measure is standardized to range from zero 
to one. I obtain a composite measure of the quality of an organization’s responses by 
taking the average score for each question.  
 
4.4. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
For Hypothesis H1, which investigates whether organizational-level heterogeneity 
overwhelms a longstanding theoretical assumption that local bodies perform better than 
central bodies, I create a dummy variable for local and central-tier organizations and 
regress these dummies on the composite measures of timeliness and quality.  
Hypothesis H2 anticipates improved responsiveness to be associated with greater 
capacity. As outlined in section 3.2., both a broader and more granular approach can be 
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used. At the broader level, I create dummy variables for local government bodies in 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Because of smaller grant cuts to local 
government budgets, Scottish and Welsh councils should be more responsive to FOI 
requests than those in England. The more granular method uses UK government data10 to 
create two continuous variables representing the log of each English council’s reported 
budget for central services (‘back-office’ functions) in 2014-15 and the percentage change 
in this budget between 2010-11 and 2014-15. 
In section 2.2, I argued that explanatory variables such as tier, resources, political 
control, competitiveness or socioeconomic variation may be overwhelmed by individual 
heterogeneity. As Fournier argues, “ceteris paribus, high heterogeneity should lead to low 
model fit” (2000: 54); consequently, if heterogeneity is present it will be exhibited via 
large model variance and resulting low measures of fit (R-squared) in the statistical 
modelling.  
Hypothesis H3 further investigates cultural heterogeneity across different 
organizations by analyzing foundational variations between the devolved institutions of 
the UK. To establish whether there is any evidence for the theorized variations in 
outcomes, I create dummies for ‘new politics’ institutions (Wales and particularly 
Scotland) against a dummy for ‘consociationalism/conflict resolution’ institutions 
(Northern Ireland). Importantly, this method cannot directly distinguish between the 
hypothetical ‘openness’ characteristics of Scotland and Wales or ‘conflict-resolving’ 
                                                          
10 2010-11 data: Local authority revenue expenditure and financing England: 2010 to 2011 
Individual local authority data. Published 9 December 2010. Revenue Account (RA) budget 
2010-11. 2014-15 data: Local authority revenue expenditure and financing England: 2014 to 
2015 Individual local authority data. Published 23 July 2014, Last updated 22 October 2014. 
Department for Communities and Local Government. Revenue Account (RA) budget 2014-15. 
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Northern Ireland: differences could instead be attributed to factors other than foundational 
motives. While there is no straightforward quantitative resolution, the research design 
exploits the significant foundational variations between the UK’s various government 
bodies and evidence from contemporary politics identified in the discussion of hypothesis 
H3 and the results.  
In addition to the main explanatory variables, data exists for local government 
bodies to examine a number of other socio-economic and political variables identified 
elsewhere in the literature.  
Certain socio-economic factors such as fiscal deficits and debt levels are 
unsuitable here because UK councils cannot incur such deficits. But other measures 
including population size (e.g. Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya 2007) and real per capita 
incomes (e.g. Alt, Lassen & Rose 2006; Piotrowski & Van Ryzin 2007) are added to the 
model and reported as Log Population and Log Gross Value Added per Head for each 
local government area.11 These models exclude the City of London Corporation because 
of this area’s extremely high GVA and extremely low resident population. 
To test party control (e.g. Piotrowski & Van Ryzin 2007, Guillamón, Bastida & 
Benito 2011), I include a dummy of the largest political party on the council, and to test 
political competitiveness (e.g. Piotrowski 2011, Worthy 2013) I use a large dataset of 
local government election results between 1999-00 and 2014-1512 to create a continuous 
                                                          
11 See Guillamón et al. 2011 for a summary of socioeconomic influences. 
12 I am grateful to Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher in providing access. 
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variable of the Effective Number of Parties (Laakso & Taagepera 1979)13 represented on 
the council.14  
 
5. RESULTS  
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE MEANS  
Before statistically analyzing variation in the timeliness and quality of UK public bodies’ 
FOI responses for each hypothesis outlined above, I first illustrate descriptive means for 
both composite measures. Timeliness scores are shown in Figure 2, disaggregated into 
three charts each showing various combinations of the tiers and territories of the UK.15 
Just over half of the public bodies (418 out of 812, or 51%) responded to both emails 
within the statutory deadline, a response rate that while poor, exceeds those of prior 
studies (Cuillier 2010; Michener & Rodriguez 2015; Worthy, John & Vanonni 2017). 
                                                          
13 The Effective Number of Parties is computed by the formula: =  
1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 , where 𝑁 the number 
of parties with at least one council seat and 𝑝𝑖
2 is the square of each party’s proportion of all seats 
on the council. A multi-year average is used because the period 2010-15 was associated with an 
“electoral meltdown” (Cutts & Russell 2015: 70, 72) in Liberal Democrat representation in which 
a previously very-competitive party at local level lost more than 1,300 councillors. This 
precipitous decline created apparently uncompetitive councils in areas that had been competitive 
for more than a decade. Rather than an unreliable snapshot of the year in which the survey was 
undertaken, competitiveness is estimated using the mean average ENP for each council over the 
16 years available. See Appendix Table A2 for complete dataset. 
14 Note that in the UK is not possible to test the percentage of voter abstention as a factor 
influencing transparency as found elsewhere (see Esteller-Moré & Polo Otero 2012) because some 
elections are coterminous with UK General Elections or devolved government elections which 
significantly (and artificially) inflate local turnout, and some councils elect by thirds. 
15 Each chart shows organizations responding to both emails by the deadline, and each bar 
represents the average for the public bodies in the relevant category. The grey dashed lines indicate 
the mean for the relevant sample. 
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Examining Figure 2, chart (a) appears to show some inter-tier variation, with 
local government slightly below the average, devolved government slightly above, and 
central government bodies close to it. Devolved bodies are most timely, with 59% 
answering both emails on time. Chart (b) shows local government variation between the 
UK’s territories, with Northern Ireland councils performing well below average, English 
councils close to it, and Scottish and Welsh councils better than average. Chart (c), 
corresponding to the expected direction of effects in Hypothesis H3, shows substantial 
differences between the devolved territories: 75% of public bodies in Scotland always 
respond by the deadline, 63% in Wales, and only 40% in Northern Ireland. 
Figure 3 shows variation in the quality of responses across the tiers and territories 
of the UK.16 Just 101 of 812 public bodies (12%) contacted in both waves provided 
exactly the information asked for in both emails and on time; 175 (22%) did not provide 
any accurate information by the deadline. The average quality score is 46%, indicating 
that less than half of the required information was received by the deadline. Overall, 
                                                          
16 See section 4.3 for the scoring criteria. 
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patterns in Figure 3 are very similar as those in Figure 2, and the correlation between the 
two measures is .66. 
 
 
5.2 STATISTICAL MODELLING  
I next investigate these patterns via statistical modelling, taking each hypothesis in turn. 
While traditional fiscal federalism theory and an albeit-limited evidence base from FOI 
theory expect local governments to be more responsive than the center, Hypothesis H1 
proposed that any purported tier effects would be overwhelmed by heterogeneity at the 
organizational level. Using Probit regression for the binary variable (timeliness) and a 
linear model for the continuous variable (quality), Table 3 summarizes the relationships 
between the central and local tiers (the devolved tier is also shown but not analyzed until 
the discussion of Hypothesis H3). Model 3A shows timeliness and model 3B quality; 
local government is the reference category. These results find no evidence to support 
fiscal federalism/FOI theory; instead, central government performance for both the 
timeliness and quality measures is not different from local government at any 
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conventional level of significance. Importantly, the R-squared reported in this and 
subsequent models are small, indicating large unexplained heterogeneity.  
Table 3 Responsiveness Measures for Devolved and Central Tiers versus Local Tiers 
 
Timeliness  
(3A) 
Quality 
(3B) 
Devolved 0.112*** 0.125*** 
 (0.044) (0.03) 
Central 0.057 0.024 
 (0.043) (0.028) 
Constant  0.424 
  (0.015) 
   
Model  Probit OLS 
Observations 812 812 
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.03 0.023 
Notes: (i) Probit results converted to marginal effects using the observed values method 
(Hanmer & Kalkan 2013). (ii) The reference category comprises local government bodies. (iii) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (iv) *p≤0.1, **p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01 
 
To corroborate this absence of tier effects as theorized in hypothesis H1, Table 4 
tests for any territory-specific effects in the central-local relationship by disaggregating 
the coefficients and marginal effects into associations for local government bodies in each 
of the four territories of UK. Model 4A shows timeliness and model 4B quality; central 
government bodies are the reference category. In general there is no difference, except 
that Northern Ireland councils are less likely to always respond at time, significant at the 
5 percent level. Although English councils are less responsive than UK central bodies, 
this association is of small magnitude and just outside statistical significance at the 10 
percent level. Except for Northern Ireland, this evidence again rejects traditional 
assumptions that local governments might be associated with improved performance. 
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Table 4: Local Government responsiveness across the 4 UK territories versus 
Central Tier bodies 
 
Timeliness  
(4A) 
Quality 
(4B) 
Scottish Local Government 0.928 0.038 
 (0.095) (0.059) 
Welsh Local Government 0.058 -0.026 
 (0.112) (0.064) 
Northern Ireland Local Government -0.275** -0.023 
 (0.108) (0.067) 
English Local Government -0.062 -0.030 
 (0.044) (0.029) 
   
Model  Probit OLS 
Observations 630 630 
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.012 0.004 
Notes: (i) Probit results as Table 3 (ii) The reference category comprises central government 
bodies. (iii) The Greater London Authority is classified as part of English local government. 
 
I next consider hypothesis H2 and the role of capacity in influencing 
responsiveness. As discussed in section 2.3, there are large numbers of possible proxies 
for capacity and Table 5 considers three of these for the timeliness measure (the quality 
measure is shown in online Table A1). The first three territory dummies shown in model 
5A represent the broader measure, namely smaller cuts to local government budgets 
between 2010-11 and 2014-15 in Scotland and Wales compared with England. The next 
two continuous variables included in model 5B show the narrower proxies using local 
government financial resource data for 353 local governments in England. These 
variables represent the percentage change in the body’s central services budget (‘back-
office’ functions) between 2010-11 and 2014-15 and the log of the body’s total budget 
for central services in 2014-15. 
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Models 5C, 5D and 5E regress the timeliness and quality scores on the additional 
socio-economic and political variables outlined in section 4. Models C and D show 
LogPopulation and LogGVA; Model E shows party political control dummies for Labour 
and Conservative) and the average Effective Number of Parties represented on the 
council over 16 years (as a proxy for political competitiveness). Model 5F presents the 
full model. 
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Table 5: Local Government Responsiveness to FOI Requests – Average Marginal 
Effects from a Probit regression (Timeliness Measure) 
 Timeliness 
(5A) 
Timeliness 
(5B) 
Timeliness 
(5C) 
Timeliness 
(5D) 
Timeliness 
(5E) 
Timeliness 
(5F) 
Explanatory Variable       
Scotland Locals 0.154*   0.156* 0.196* 0.203** 
 (0.091)   (0.090) (0.106) (0.096) 
Wales Locals 0.119   0.101 0.142 0.132 
 (0.109)   (0.112) (0.115) (0.115) 
NI Locals -0.212**   -0.185*   
 (0.105)   (0.111)   
Capacity: % Change in 
Central Services 
budget, England only 
 0.013   
(0.084) 
 
 
 
 
Capacity: Log Central 
Services budget, £, 
2014, England only 
 0.046   
(0.036) 
    
Log Population   0.167** 0.063*  0.047 
 
  (0.080) (0.032)  (0.035) 
Log GVA    -0.103  -0.098 
 
   (0.074)  (0.079) 
Labour     0.150 0.124 
 
    (0.097) (0.099) 
Conservatives     0.125 0.124 
 
    (0.100) (0.101) 
Effective Number of 
Parties (16-yr 
Average) 
    0.011  
(0.053) 
 
       
       
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.004 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Number of 
Observations (iv) 433 353 433 433 407 407 
Notes: (i) Probit results as Table 3. (ii) The reference category comprises local government 
bodies in England.  (iii) Delta-method Standard Errors in Parentheses, *p≤0.1, **p≤0.05, *** 
p≤0.01. (iv) Because the party control variables have no relevance in Northern Ireland’s party 
system, the Northern Ireland local dummy is excluded from Models 5E and 5F.  
 
 How Institutional Culture Trumps Tier Effects 
 
36 
Model 5A shows results for local government responsiveness in the four territories of 
the UK without controls. Although territory does not explain the quality of an 
organization’s responses (online model A1A), for the timeliness score (model 5A) 
Scottish councils were 15 percentage points more likely to always respond on time than 
English councils (significant at the 10 percent level), and Northern Ireland councils 21 
percentage points less likely to respond on time than English councils (significant at the 
5 percent level). That Scottish councils perform better is consistent with the ordering 
predicted for hypothesis H2. The coefficient for Welsh councils is positive relative to 
English councils, although the relationship does not reach conventional levels of 
significance. 
In contrast, for the more granular measures of capacity (model 5B), modelling 
does not corroborate hypothesis H2 that governments subject to greater capacity 
challenges would be associated with poorer responsiveness – the marginal effects 
reported here lie far outside significance. Investigating the alternative factors proposed in 
the literature, and for the timeliness measure, a larger log population is associated with 
greater local government responsiveness at the 5% level as a standalone variable (model 
5C), an association which remains significant but at the 10% level in the fuller models 
5D and 5F.17 In contrast with timeliness, neither territory nor socioeconomic factors have 
                                                          
17 In Appendix Table A1, population has no association with response quality, but Log GVA has 
a small (negative) effect at the 5 percent level as a standalone variable (model A1C) and in the 
full model (A1F), indicating that higher area incomes are associated with lower quality 
responses. 
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explanatory power for quality scores (online model A1). None of the political variables 
shown in model 5E are significant.18  
A final hypothesis, H3, anticipated that ‘new politics’ intermediate-tier 
institutions in Scotland and Wales would outperform Northern Ireland’s conflict-
resolving institutions that are lineal descendants of an older, more secretive government 
apparatus. Returning to Table 3, there is strong empirical evidence that territory matters: 
the top row corroborates the descriptive means in Figures 2 and 3. Devolved 
governments and their agencies are 11 percent more likely to respond on time and have 
a 13 percent higher quality score than UK local governments, both significant at the 1 
percent level.  
Table 6 disaggregates this combined devolved-tier effect into separate results 
for Scotland and Wales; Northern Ireland is the reference category. These findings are 
stark: the Scottish Government and its agencies are 34 percent more likely to respond on 
time and have a 20 percent higher quality score than their Northern Ireland counterparts, 
both significant at the 1 percent level. Although there is no difference in quality, Wales’ 
devolved bodies are 21 percent more likely to respond on time, significant at the 5 
percent level and again in the direction anticipated by hypothesis H3. 
                                                          
18 For the timeliness measure, Labour and Conservative as standalone variables are both positive; 
in fact, the Labour dummy significant at the 5% level. But this is a Northern Ireland party system 
effect: once Northern Ireland is included as a control variable the association vanishes. 
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Table 6: Responsiveness by Devolved-Tier Bodies in the UK 
 
Timeliness  
(6A) 
Quality 
(6B) 
Scotland Devolved 0.335*** 0.203*** 
 (0.063) (0.058) 
Wales Devolved 0.205** -0.087 
 (0.092) (0.075) 
   
Model  Probit OLS 
Observations 182 182 
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.08 0.07 
Note: Probit results as Table 3, Northern Ireland is the reference category. 
 
Again, the low measures of fit for models 6A and 6B provide evidence of large 
heterogeneity at the organizational level that has not (and probably could not) be 
captured in large-N data. Nevertheless, the strength of these coefficients and marginal 
effects suggests that hypothesis H3 appears a closer explanation of performance across 
the UK’s territories than administrative capacity constraints or ‘first generation’ fiscal 
federalism theory. While quantitative data is unsuitable for direct tests of institutional 
culture, there are a number of contemporary cues suggesting that such influences may 
affect the markedly different findings between Northern Ireland and Scotland. In June 
2015, the Northern Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel was served with the 
first Enforcement notice of its type by the Information Commissioner’s Office, and a 
series of media reports from this period suggest a climate of non-transparency 
permeating from the very top of the department: 
“[The Department of Finance and Personnel] censured for refusal to answer FoI 
requests” (Belfast News Letter, 2 February 2015) 
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“Stormont department ignored FoI request for almost four years” (Belfast News 
Letter, 9 June 2015) 
“Alarm over Stormont special advisors vetting FOI requests” (Irish News, 1 
September 2016) 
“Stormont admits: We’re now massively less transparent than under direct rule” 
(Belfast News Letter, 20 June 2015).  
In contrast, in 2016, the Scottish Government became one of the 15 founding 
subnational government participants of the Open Government Partnership (OGP 2016). 
Importantly, Northern Ireland’s poorer responsiveness cannot be explained by a different 
regulatory environment or a weaker capacity for public responses than the other 
devolved governments. Northern Ireland has the same legal Freedom of Information 
arrangements as England and Wales, and despite a smaller population, 55 press officers 
were employed by the Northern Ireland Executive in 2016, compared with 45 by the 
Scottish Government, 21 by the Welsh Government and 54 by the Republic of Ireland 
government (Irish News, 23 September 2016).  
Secondary evidence of the importance of institutional histories can be derived 
from the equally poor performance by Northern Ireland’s local councils for the 
timeliness measure. In section 3.3., I argue that characteristics of local government in 
the province – sectarian partisan competition and historic discrimination by some 
councils in employment and housing – are directly connected with Northern Ireland’s 
history of conflict. That Table 4 shows Northern Ireland’s councils to be significantly 
(and uniquely) less timely in their responsiveness than their counterparts elsewhere again 
points to the importance of institutional culture in subsequent responsiveness. FOIs 
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submitted to local councils are directly associated with post-conflict sensitivities because 
of their capacity to reveal information that could (in a local council’s view) undermine 
that organization’s authority with respect to one side of the nationalist/unionist divide.  
If markedly different responsiveness both between- and within- the tiers of 
government in the UK is reflective of individual- and organizational cultural biases with 
respect to openness, this is an important result for the government administration 
literature that would open up a research agenda where new hypotheses could be 
developed and tested with qualitative methods. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Over the past three decades of academic inquiry, classic decentralization theory 
– the “idealized notion of decentralized governance as fostering all things wonderful” 
(Wibbels 2006: 169) – has been challenged and subsequently replaced by more cautious, 
context-specific explanations that focus instead on the ways in which institutional settings 
shape the incentives of public actors. In place of ‘tier effects’, these recent contributions 
suggest a number of cross-cutting correlates of improved responsiveness, including 
officer-level variations in attitudes towards transparency, capacity constraints, cultural 
orientations of institutions towards (or away from) greater openness, and other socio-
economic and political correlates such as area populations, local per capita incomes, 
ideology, and political competitiveness.  
To investigate these potential correlates of responsiveness, I take advantage of 
the UK’s comprehensive FOI legislation and intermediate-tier governments established 
for entirely different foundational motives to undertake an innovative large-N research 
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design. Sending two FOI requests to a universe of 812 UK public bodies with an executive 
function, I construct two objective measures of the timeliness and quality of an 
organization’s responses from a large database.  
Extensive statistical analysis does not corroborate the theorized associations 
between responsiveness and most of these correlates, excepting limited evidence for 
population (with respect to the timeliness measure) and area incomes (quality measure), 
and stronger evidence for the importance of within-tier variation with respect to 
institutional openness (hypothesis H3). The models report a high degree of heterogeneity 
in FOI responses, perhaps reflecting evidence of variation in the biases and experiences 
of responders or local political leaderships, or hidden practices to circumvent full 
compliance with FOI legislation that are extremely difficult to identify in either 
quantitative or qualitative research (Roberts 2005). 
Apart from heterogeneity, the best fit in the statistical modelling appears to be 
the third hypothesis which drew attention to the importance of foundational 
underpinnings in inclining institutions towards – or away from – greater openness. There 
is substantial variation between the UK’s devolved governments: Scottish bodies 
performed significantly better than their Northern Irish counterparts where transparency 
concerns rank below conflict resolution as the primary political objective for the devolved 
institutions. Although evidenced by large coefficients and marginal effects in the 
expected direction and indications from contemporary FOI developments in Northern 
Ireland, this hypothesis cannot be definitively confirmed because cultural biases such as 
these cannot be directly measured by large-N quantitative data. Additional qualitative 
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work would be required to corroborate the connections between institutional cultures and 
responsiveness as developed in this article. 
If institutional cultures dominate, it is an important result that coheres with recent 
evidence in the literature that progressive transparency and anti-corruption reforms have 
inconsistent results in different country, regional and cultural settings. First, the apparent 
importance of institutions’ cultural orientations towards openness aligns with evidence 
summarized in Lieberman (2018) that quality is strongly affected by local social 
structures and institutions, with improved results found where institutions are designed to 
help connect citizens to government officials. Second, notwithstanding the UK’s FOI 
legislation that imposes equal requirements on all public bodies, government 
responsiveness was clearly not equal across the four territories of the UK. This replicates 
in an OECD setting a result found in other case countries, namely that transparency 
reforms are insufficient on their own, and that positive results for accountability require 
a broader-based process of public or societal engagement where the public rises to the 
challenge of monitoring the work of government (Bauhr & Grimes 2014). Absent such 
engagement and institutional trust, increased transparency has even been found elsewhere 
to demobilize citizens from the political process (Chong et al. 2018). 
Of course, other explanations are possible. In addition to substantial unexplained 
variance, Northern Ireland’s local government indicators improved between the 
timeliness and quality scores. There is also little difference between the tiers for the 
quality measure in general. This study also left unanswered whether the annual volume 
of FOI requests may affect an organization’s performance.  
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But that such a comprehensive field experiment could not find evidence of the 
theorized correlates of responsiveness poses a significant challenge to the fiscal 
federalism and emerging FOI literatures. Far from an incidental side benefit, the assumed 
connections between accountability, transparency and responsiveness and decentralized 
forms of government have been “central to the motivations of real world reformers” 
(Faguet 2014: 2). To investigate these assertions this article employed a research design 
that drew from the UK’s comprehensive FOI legislation and significant institutional 
variation to measure the responsiveness of more than 800 public bodies across three tiers 
of government. Given that it is hard to imagine an alternative design that would allow 
these claims to be tested in an equally-replicable manner, this absence of empirical 
confirmation poses a serious challenge to the more fundamental claims about 
decentralization that have informed both academic debate and real-world practice. 
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